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EITHER/OR?  WILL CLIMATE CHANGE FORCE A CHOICE 
BETWEEN SALMON AND ELECTRICITY IN THE NORTHWEST? 
By John M. Volkman* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 Salmon and other cold-water fish species play a significant role in the debate over the 
Columbia River.  For many decades the objective has been to avoid either/or choices between 
salmon and human uses of the river; the assumption has been that we can have both.  The 
viability of this assumption was drawn into question when salmon populations reached critical 
levels in 1980s, and even more so with the Endangered Species Act listings in the 1990s.  The 
question will press more sharply with climate change because these species are so sensitive to 
streamflows, water temperatures and ocean conditions, all of which are likely to warm with the 
climate. 
One of the most important human enterprises on the Columbia River and one of the most 
significant factors in the salmon declines is hydropower generation, and thus the question posed 
by the title of this paper:  is the either/or point finally upon us?  It is a fair question in one sense, 
but I have some caveats:  First, no one supposes that the whole Columbia River hydropower 
system could be removed to make the river more hospitable to salmon; the debate has always 
been over smaller compromises.  Even the dam-breaching debates of the 1990s involved four 
dams, not the whole system.  Second, focusing on the role of hydropower dams alone in the 
salmon declines is an over-simplification.  Salmon spend most of their lives outside the 
Columbia River – in mountain headwaters, tributary streams, the estuary and the Pacific Ocean.  
How these areas function ecologically in a changing climate will have a great deal to do with 
salmon survival regardless of what happens to hydropower.  Finally, Columbia River policy will 
be even more complicated as the climate changes because various human systems – energy, 
irrigation, water supply – may be destabilized as salmon decline.  How these sources of 
instability interact will change the way the salmon declines are seen and dealt with. 
There are so many unknowns about how these things will take shape that all one can do 
in a paper like this is reexamine what is known (the past) and speculate about the unknown (the 
future).  This paper does that.  The next section provides the background and the section 
following it speculates about what may be coming, near-term and long-term.   
II. BACKGROUND 
 A. Hydropower and other contributors to the salmon declines 
Salmon declines can be traced to the early 20th century, before hydropower was a gleam 
in the Army Corps of Engineers’ eye.  Salmon habitat has been under pressure from mining, 
timber harvest, irrigation, grazing and other activities since the 19th century.  A mining boom hit 
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many parts of the basin in the 1860s and generated demand for grain, sheep and cows.  Livestock 
production began to take off in the 1850s and 1860s, and climbed through the end of the century.  
Crops required irrigation in the Basin's dry interior, and by the end of the 19th century many of 
the basin's streams were fully appropriated.  Timber cutters used streams and rivers to float huge 
numbers of logs to market.  Salmon harvest began to decline in the early 1920s, and one can 
assume the population declines began before they began to show up in harvest statistics.   
Hydropower development occurred between 1930 and the mid-1970s, when the flood 
gates on the last dam on the Lower Snake River closed.  By 1975, a salmon from Idaho, 
northeastern Oregon, or northern Washington would have to traverse eight major mainstem dams 
twice:  once as juveniles on their way to the ocean and again on the return journey to their 
spawning beds.  Just one mainstem dam kills something like 5-10% of the juveniles migrating 
downstream and 5-15% of the adults migrating back upstream.  Multiply these numbers by eight 
for Snake River or Upper Columbia populations.  Moreover, the effects of dams are not just in 
direct fish mortality, but in the way the river works ecologically.  Dams alter river temperature, 
chemistry, turbidity, nutrients, and flow.  While it is difficult to tie any one of these things to 
specific changes in salmon survival, they clearly have ecological consequences, favoring non-
native species over the species that evolved in an unregulated river.1 
These impacts landed on top of the impacts of continuing habitat development.   We 
sometimes think of habitat development as having been a less significant factor in the salmon 
declines because they were incremental, site-specific and, one assumes, reversible.  But they are 
a major factor cumulatively.  The idea that they are readily reversible ignores factors such as 
private property, western water law, the economic momentum of development, and the fact that 
people rely on these activities for their livelihoods.   
Reversing hydropower development is no less difficult a prospect.  It is almost idiotic to 
say it, but remember that the dams are already there.   It would take an enormous and 
unprecedented effort to remove them.  It isn’t so much that there would be a lot of concrete to 
remove as that the concrete is connected to a powerful and far-reaching energy and economic 
system that reaches into every corner of the Northwest and beyond.  The Columbia River dams 
supply energy, almost half the electric energy in the Northwest.  The dams light homes and drive 
industry.  While there are other ways to generate energy, one would have to replace hydropower 
with something more expensive or polluting, and it would take a great deal of political will and 
economic investment to make such a transition.  The dams currently generate about $2 billion 
annually in energy revenues, support a massive energy and transmission system, and fund large-
scale fish, wildlife and energy conservation programs.  Hydropower radiates out from the 
Northwest into other parts of the country.  The Columbia River feeds California and Southwest 
energy markets.  The hydropower system is not just a U. S. system; more than half of the river’s 
hydropower and flood control storage is in Canada.  Canada is also linked to California and 
Southwest markets through the Northwest’s transmission lines.  And the hydropower dams are 
not just energy producers.  They make navigation possible as far as the Oregon-Idaho border, 
connecting farms from Montana and other inland states to international markets, are 
hydraulically connected into some of the country’s largest reclamation projects, supply flat water 
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for recreation, and protect areas like Portland from floods.  So, this is a big, complex system of 
interacting benefits that reach into virtually every corner of the Northwest.  This is what people 
usually mean when they talk about the benefits of the Columbia River, and it strongly colors 
discussions of un-doing hydropower development. 
 
There also should be no mistaking the seriousness with which many people in the 
Northwest regard the decline of salmon.  To many people, the Northwest is defined by wherever 
salmon spawn.  People my age grew up around rivers that teemed with salmon, where Indian 
fishermen were still netting big fish at Celilo Falls, and coastal canneries supported a vibrant 
fishing economy.  The public’s response to the fact that Columbia River salmon are now 
endangered is visceral and grim.  Gratitude for cheap energy and pride in great structures like 
Grand Coulee Dam don’t erase the sense of loss that comes with the salmon declines, or the 
sense that we are leaving a poorer world to our grandchildren.    
 
B. The salmon debate2 
 
  1. The debate leading up to 2000 
 
People have assumed that hydropower and salmon do not represent an either/or choice, 
just as they assumed in the 19th century that salmon could not be wiped out by mining, timber 
harvest and other activities.  Salmon were so bountiful that they seemed inextinguishable.  
However, more than 100 years after the great summer Chinook runs were over-harvested into 
oblivion, we have yet to find that balance point between robust salmon runs and human uses of 
the river. 
 
Since the early 1970s, Columbia River policy has been driven by salmon declines on the 
one hand and the importance of hydropower on the other.  In response, the region has developed 
a large-scale salmon program.  In the 1970s, the salmon declines provoked Indian treaty 
litigation over harvest and, to a lesser extent, the Columbia River dams.  During the 1980s, a 
spate of remedial salmon programs was enacted, to coordinate harvest management and address 
the effects of the dams.  Ten years later, when the salmon declines persisted and salmon were 
listed under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), various policy initiatives engaged:  the so-called 
Salmon Summit, Northwest Power Planning Council rulemaking processes and ESA 
consultations over federal dams, land management, hatcheries and harvest.  In the mid-1990s, a 
multi-year drought, unfavorable ocean conditions and litigation deepened the crisis and remedial 
programs again ratcheted up.  In 2002, the General Accounting Office reported estimated direct 
federal agency expenditures on salmon recovery at almost $1.8 billion from 1982 through 1996 
and about $1.5 billion from 1997 through 2001, not counting the cost of replacement energy and 
foregone energy revenues.3  Using federal power marketers’ calculations of foregone energy 
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3  United States General Accounting Office report GAO-02-612, Columbia River Basin Salmon 
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revenues and replacement power costs, the Columbia-Snake River flow program costs many 
millions of dollars per year.  The marketers calculate these costs in light of market conditions 
and so they vary greatly year to year, but the energy marketers put a staggering $1.5 billion value 
on it for FY 2001, a year when west coast energy prices went through the roof.   
 
The effects of these mitigation measures are more difficult to assess.  To take one 
example, the biological effects of flow augmentation, the most costly single element in the 
salmon program, cannot be measured directly, and the rationale for flow augmentation has 
changed over time.  At first, it was thought to help spring-migrating juveniles but was 
unimportant for summer migrants.  The initial flow program, then, worked exclusively in the 
spring.  Now, the evidence suggests some positive benefit for spring migrants but a much 
stronger benefit for summer migrants.  But for spring or summer migrants, the benefits are hard 
to measure.  Another example:  it is no longer clear whether fish hatcheries, the staple of salmon 
mitigation for decades, have positive or negative effects on salmon populations.  So, the point is 
that dams have big effects on salmon for which there are no very good remedies. 
 
It was in part frustration with these elusive increments of benefit that gave rise to the idea 
of radically lowering the Lower Snake River reservoirs in the early 1990s.  Snake River salmon 
and steelhead were listed under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) in 1990.  Just before the 
listings were final, a regional Salmon Summit was convened.  There, Idaho Governor Andrus 
proposed that the four lower Snake River reservoirs be radically lowered to decrease their cross-
sections and speed the flow of the river to help salmon.  The idea was received cautiously, 
although the Northwest Power Planning Council endorsed a significant test of the idea in 1994 
(the Council never pressed this).  By 1995, the Lower Snake River draw-down idea had evolved:   
Corps of Engineers analysis showed that removing earth-fill portions of the dams would be 
cheaper and more effective than retrofitting them to operate at lower head.  This became the 
Lower Snake River dam-breaching concept. 
 
Since the concept was developed, the rationale for breaching has shifted.  It was 
originally conceived as a way to speed up the river’s flow, on the theory that juvenile spring 
migrants need to reach the estuary on a biological time clock that can’t be met with the slow-
moving behind the dams.  In 1996, an independent scientific panel suggested that fewer 
reservoirs in the river’s mainstem would open up important habitat for fall chinook, historically 
the largest populations in the Columbia.  Rather than just seeing the river as a corridor through 
which fish should pass as quickly as possible, this theory proposed that the mainstem of the river 
could serve as habitat for large “core” populations of fish that could anchor the runs through 
environmental fluctuations. Finally, dam-breaching proponents have argued that breaching could 
improve river temperatures, a growing concern under the ESA and the Clean Water Act.   
 
There is scientific debate over the need for and sufficiency of dam breaching as a Snake 
River salmon recovery measure.  In 1998, a relatively exhaustive technical analysis of salmon 
recovery options (called PATH, the Plan for Analyzing and Testing Hypotheses) had concluded 
that breaching Lower Snake River dams would likely enable Snake River spring chinook salmon 
to reach ESA recovery thresholds.  The Northwest Fisheries Science Center, a group of scientists 
associated with the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), the federal ESA agency for 
salmon, agreed that breaching would help Snake River fish.  However, Center scientists were not 
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persuaded that the fish would reach recovery thresholds or that the same thing could not be 
achieved by other means:  “even for the best studied ESU [population], the Snake River 
Spring/Summer Chinook salmon, there is good evidence that dam breaching would increase 
[population growth], but not enough evidence to say by how much.  Similarly, there is some 
evidence that habitat improvements might increase [population growth] for this ESU, but not 
enough evidence to calculate a likely percent increase.”   
 
More broadly, the rationale for dam breaching is therefore limited in two ways:  it is 
largely theoretical, and it plays out differently for different dams and fish populations.  A faster 
Lower Snake River might or might not make enough of a difference to restore Snake River 
salmon.  The Lower Snake may or may not be good mainstem habitat.  Breaching Lower Snake 
River dams would provide no benefit for any but Snake River fish.  The weakest fish 
populations, like those in the upper Columbia, would see no benefit at all.   
 
So, while dam-breaching has been part of the debate since the early 1990s, it hasn’t left 
the launch pad.  The two Northwest political figures who publicly endorsed the concept of 
breaching dams – Governor Andrus in the early 1990s and Oregon Governor John Kitzhaber in 
the late 1990s – were lone political voices on this issue.  Neither generated significant support 
for the idea in state legislatures or Congress.  In 1994, the Northwest Power Planning Council 
majority that endorsed the idea of lowering two lower Snake River reservoirs to help fish lasted 
about a month after the vote.  At about the same time, some breaching proponents reported such 
slack-jawed amazement in Congress at the idea of dam-breaching that it became hard even to 
keep saying the words on lobbying trips.  This was at a time in which the salmon crisis was at a 
crest, the focus riveted on Snake River fish populations that were so close to extinction that some 
could be counted on one hand. 
 
2. The 2000 biological opinion and its rejection 
 
In the early 1990s, regional and federal salmon initiatives met with strong skepticism in 
court.  In 1994, a federal district court characterized a National Marine Fisheries Service 
biological opinion as:   
 
seriously, ‘significantly’ flawed because it is too heavily geared towards a status quo that 
has allowed all forms of river activity to proceed in a deficit situation, that is, relatively 
small steps, minor improvements and adjustments, when the situation literally cries out 
for a major overhaul.  Instead of looking for what can be done to protect the species from 
jeopardy, NMFS and the action agencies have narrowly focused their attention on what 
the establishment is capable of handling with minimal disruption. 
 
Idaho Department of Fish and Game v. National Marine Fisheries Service, et al., 850 F Supp 
886 (D. Ore. 1994). 
 
The Ninth Circuit delivered a similar message to the Northwest Power Planning Council:   
 
The Council’s approach seems largely to have been from the premise that only small 
steps are possible, in light of entrenched river user claims of economic hardship. 
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Northwest Resource Information Center v. Northwest Power Planning Council, 35 F.3d 1371 
(9th Cir. 1994). 
  
The Council strengthened its program in 1994 (and then backed away from its limited 
endorsement of Lower Snake River reservoir draw-downs).  The Fisheries Service developed an 
interim biological opinion to provide protection for the runs until 1999, when it hinted that major 
decisions about dam reconfiguration (read dam-breaching) would be made.  As 1999 
approached, however, the Fisheries Service faced an obvious dilemma.  It has no authority to 
require dam breaching and even if it did, breaching Snake River dams would do nothing for 
other populations.  The question was whether there was any other way to avoid jeopardy to the 
runs?  If not, the salmon-hydropower conflict would have to go to the Endangered Species 
exemption committee.   
 
In 2000, the Service completed a new biological opinion concluding that the dams pose 
jeopardy to the runs, but jeopardy could be avoided by improving habitat in tributary watersheds 
and the estuary.  The strategy was strongly supported by the Clinton Administration, Vice 
President Gore in particular.  The current Administration has been more lukewarm about the 
strategy, and funding for many elements of the strategy has been slowed.  Whether for these or 
other reasons, a group of environmental groups challenged the biological opinion in court. 
 
On May 7 of this year, a federal judge in Oregon found the 2000 biological opinion 
arbitrary and capricious.4  The opinion’s primary defect, in the court’s view, was the its reliance 
on federal habitat programs that had not gone through ESA consultation and non-federal habitat 
programs that were not “reasonably certain to occur.”  The judge remanded the opinion to the 
NMFS with instructions to develop a new opinion within a year.  The judge has not yet said 
whether the 2000 biological opinion can remain in place pending development of the new 
opinion.  If the 2000 opinion is not left in place, it could mean that by continuing to operate the 
hydropower dams, the federal agencies would illegally “take” fish in violation of the ESA.  If the 
2000 opinion were left in place, it would provide only interim protection against take liability. 
 
The is the backdrop against which my speculations about the effects of a changing 
climate are played. 
 
III. EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
A. “Facts” About Climate Change in the Northwest5 
                                                 
4  National Wildlife Federation v. National Marine Fisheries Service, CR 01-640-RE (D. Ore. 
2003). 
5  Much of the work on climate change in the Northwest comes from the Climate Impacts Group 
at the University of Washington, and this section of this paper is drawn largely from that work.  The 
Climate Impacts Group’s work is summarized in U. S. Global Change Research Program, Climate 
Change Impacts on the United States:  The Potential Consequences of Climate Variability and Change, 
Final Synthesis Team Report, “Impacts of Climate Variability and Change, Pacific Northwest” (1999) 
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Of course, we don’t have many facts about climate change.  Computer models and 
analytical indices of climate change don’t actually predict, at most they tell us about likelihoods.  
But here is what the modelers tell use about potential trends in the Northwest:  Annual 
precipitation will probably not change a great deal as the climate changes.  The effects are likely 
to be seasonal – winters will be warmer and wetter.  The models diverge on whether summers 
will be wetter or drier.  Much of the debate over climate change revolves around these few 
likelihoods, deceptive in their simplicity. 
The effects of climate change on water storage in the Columbia system are likely to be 
significant.  Warmer winters would mean “sharply less” snowpack (Impacts of Climate 
Variability at 27) and earlier spring snowmelt.  Unlike the Colorado River, whose reservoirs 
store ten times the river’s annual runoff, Columbia reservoirs store only 60 percent of a year’s 
runoff.  The rest of the Columbia’s storage is in snowpack.  Less snowpack and earlier snow 
melt will have “profound” effects on streamflow; late spring and summer flows are also likely to 
be “sharply” reduced.6  Moreover, this shift will have a political element.  Snowpack is likely to 
shrink more in southern areas than northern areas, and because Canada is further north, more and 
more storage will be in the Canadian part of the basin.   
As snowpack changes, mainstem reservoirs will be drier in the summer for reasons 
related to flood control operations.  The Army Corps of Engineers, which manages flood control 
in the Columbia, drains the Columbia River storage reservoirs in late winter so there is room to 
store runoff in the spring to protect against floods.  So, even though there is likely to be more 
rain and higher flows in the rivers in the winter, it will be evacuated before spring, and so have 
little or no benefit in the salmon migration season – spring and summer.   Rather, because there 
will be less snowpack to supply spring and summer streamflows, storage reservoirs will have to 
work much harder to meet irrigation and streamflow needs.  Lower reservoir levels at the end of 
summer will be harder to refill in time for fall and early winter energy loads before the rains 
begin.  It is not hard to imagine more successive years where storage projects don't refill and are 
drafted deeper and deeper.7 
The effects of less snowpack and earlier snow-melt will also be felt in smaller tributaries, 
where many fish populations spawn and rear.  In these areas, the tension between instream needs 
of fish and the out-of-stream needs of water users, largely for irrigated farming, is already 
considerable.  Even apart from the competition for instream flows, economic pressures on 
agriculture may be leading to practices that will be unsustainable in a warmer climate.  The 
University of Washington Climate Impacts Group describes how some of these pressures are 
affecting the Yakima basin:  junior water users drill illegal wells to minimize crop damage in 
drought years; water reuse and other efficiencies reduce return flows to streams; and crops that 
can sustain an occasional dry year are being replaced by higher-value crops that can’t.  These 
things wring slack out of the system and leave less ability to adapt to a warming climate.  
Conflicts between instream flow programs for species and consumptive water users can be 
expected to heighten. 
                                                                                                                                                             
(hereafter “Climate Change Impacts”) available online at 
http://www.usgcrp.gov/usgcrp/Library/nationalassessment/pnw.pdf. 
6 Climate Change Impacts 37. 
7 Personal communication, James Ruff, NMFS Hydro Division, March 7, 2003. 
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Climate change also has implications for stream temperatures.  Salmon, bull trout and 
other cold water fishes are highly sensitive to temperature.  In the fall, cooling rivers trigger 
upstream migrations.  Spawning begins when water temperatures decrease.  Eggs incubate over 
the winter or early spring when temperatures are coolest.  Rising spring water temperatures are 
thought to cue downstream migration.8  Temperatures are a problem in the Columbia River 
mainstem and in many tributaries.9  Federal agencies in the Northwest have struggled to develop 
Clean Water Act water temperature standards that pass ESA muster and can be achieved across a 
landscape that has lost much of its natural cooling mechanisms (watershed groundwater storage 
and riparian cover).10  To state the obvious, this problem will worsen as stream temperatures 
creep up. 
Finally, climate change will have effects in the Pacific Ocean, which will affect 
anadromous fish there and inland.  Salmon and other anadromous fish spend most of their lives.  
If ocean conditions are unfavorable to Columbia River populations, fewer fish will return to 
spawn.11  Fluctuations in the ocean can cause qualitative shifts in the structure of entire 
communities of species.12  Coupled ocean–atmosphere changes impact inland areas through 
drought, flood, heat, cold and storms.  Researchers are developing the ability to predict some 
effects, such as the El Niño/Southern Oscillation or ENSO, in which warm water at the ocean’s 
surface in the eastern tropical Pacific off South America affects weather and climate in the 
Pacific.  However, ENSO is only one of the mechanisms by which the ocean and atmosphere 
influence one another.  Ocean-atmospheric coupling occurs on many time scales, even over 
centuries.13  The risk of crossing critical climate thresholds, triggering irreversible change (such 
                                                 
8 Policy Workgroup of the EPA Region 10 Water Temperature Criteria Guidance Project, 
Technical Synthesis Scientific Issues Relating to Temperature Criteria for Salmon, Trout, and Char 
Native to the Pacific Northwest, pp. 5-6 (August 1, 2001). 
9  Independent Science Group, Return to the River: Restoration of Salmonid Fishes in the 
Columbia River Ecosystem (2000):  “Temperature is a critical habitat variable that is very much 
influenced by regulation of flow and impoundments.  The mainstem reservoirs are relatively shallow and 
heat up in late summer causing concern for salmon survival. The lower reaches of some key tributaries 
also are very warm in late summer because they are dewatered by irrigation withdrawals. Due to the 
extreme importance of temperature regimes to the ecology of salmonids in the basin, temperature 
information merits special attention as a key habitat descriptor (Coutant 1999).”  (Quoted in U. S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Region 10 Guidance For Pacific Northwest State and Tribal 
Temperature Water Quality Standards at p. 8 (EPA 910-B-03-002, April, 2003). 
10 Many streams in the region are on the Clean Water Act section 303(d) list because of elevated 
temperatures.  A 1999 ESA biological opinion on Oregon’s water temperature standards provided only 
interim ESA coverage pending the Environmental Protection Agency’s development of water temperature 
guidance that would lead to more protective temperature standards.  In 2003, the biological opinion and 
the Oregon standards were struck down in federal court.  See Northwest Environmental Advocates v. EPA, 
No. CV-01-510-HA (D. Or. Mar. 31, 2003).  EPA quickly released new temperature guidance.  U. S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Region 10 Guidance for Pacific Northwest State and Tribal 
Temperature Water Quality Standards, supra. 
11 National Research Council, Upstream: Salmon and Society in the Pacific Northwest 39 (1996). 
12  Return to the River at 376. 
13  M. McCartney, “Oceans and Climate:  The Ocean’s Role in Climate and Climate Change,” 
Oceanus 2-3 (fall/winter 1996). 
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as a major ocean circulation change) is taken increasingly seriously in discussions of climate 
change.14 
 
B. Speculation about near-term effects 
 
Intellectually, I know there is no way to say that any single year actually is the result of 
climate change or represents what we can expect from climate change over the longer term.  But 
we know that snowpack is actually receding in the Canadian Rockies – those glaciers have 
already shrunk, it’s not just a distant possibility.  And in my heart of hearts, I am afraid that 2001 
does illustrate what’s likely to happen as the climate warms up.  In 2001, a combination of 
circumstances that journalists called “the perfect storm” occurred:  hot weather, the second-driest 
water year on record, over-stretched energy supplies and sky-rocketing energy prices.  Columbia 
River hydropower operators were under immense pressure to generate power to avoid blackouts 
in California, and they swung operations into full generation mode.  In the first operating year 
after adoption of the 2000 biological opinion, longstanding salmon operations were abandoned.  
Two years later, the federal energy system is still trying to recover financially, squeezing fish 
and wildlife programs to save money.  This is telling my instincts something about what we can 
expect from a warmer climate and a river that is stressed by growing energy demands and energy 
markets that live on prices swings. 
 
At the same time, however, look at what was happening to salmon population numbers in 
2000-2002:  Salmon have rebounded, at least temporarily.  Populations for which harvest had 
been closed for decades have returned in harvestable numbers.  Most scientists attribute the 
upswing to favorable ocean conditions, the duration of which they cannot predict. 
 
If 2001 is a sample of what is in store for us over the longer term, then, here is what we 
can expect:  human uses of rivers will be under more strain, making it hard to look to them for 
sacrifices to help species, while the response of the species to what is going on in the 
environment is unclear, sometimes surging in a positive direction at the same time human-
managed salmon recovery programs are being scaled back.  
 
With the court’s opinion in National Wildlife Federation v. National Marine Fisheries 
Service finding the 2000 biological opinion arbitrary and capricious, there is an opportunity to 
re-test the hydropower-salmon equation.  Over the next year, the federal agencies will have to 
come up with a new opinion whether the hydropower system jeopardizes salmon.  If my instinct 
is right, it is one of the early tests of how we (the societal “we”) adjust salmon conservation 
policy to a climate that is already changing, seeing the kinds of interacting pressures of warm 
weather, low water, and destabilized industries.  My speculation about what will happen on 
remand is:  not very much. 
 
The world on remand is different from that of 1998-2000, when the first biological 
opinion was developed.  While ESA populations are still in trouble, salmon populations 
generally are bigger.  The ESA salmon listings are under a coast-wide review, the result of a 
2001 court ruling that NMFS had improperly failed to list hatchery components of the 
                                                 
14  Editorial comment, “The Thermohaline Ocean Circulation: a System With Dangerous 
Thresholds?”  46 Climatic Change 247–256 (2000). 
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“evolutionarily significant” population units it had identified for ESA consideration.15  The ruling 
has prompted the agency to review its approach to hatchery fish, with unknown implications. 
 
The world is also different on the energy front.  The stratospheric energy prices and 
chaotic energy markets of the late 1990s and early 2000s have settled down, so there is no saying 
that hydropower salmon operations have to be curtailed to avert blackouts in California.  But the 
industry is edgy and uncertain, no longer so confident about the marvels of the market and still 
trying to recovery from the effects of the perfect storm of 2001.     
 
With these things in the mix, my guess is that NOAA-Fisheries16 will go back, complete 
ESA consultation on federal habitat programs and try to pin down non-federal habitat programs 
so that they are more certain.  Perhaps the agency will add an element of hatchery 
supplementation.  But my speculation is that the result will be a similar to that reached in 2000:  
some strengthening of habitat restoration programs; no suggestion of dam breaching. 
 
Another possibility is that NOAA-Fisheries will conclude that the hydropower system 
jeopardizes salmon and there is no reasonable and prudent way to avoid it.  In that event, an 
Endangered Species Committee would likely be convened to consider an exemption for the 
hydropower system.  The Committee would be obliged to look for reasonable and prudent ways 
to conserve the species.  If jeopardy cannot be avoided, the Committee must determine whether 
operating the hydropower system is “in the public interest and is of national or regional 
significance,” and “the benefits of such action clearly outweigh the benefits of alternative 
courses of action.”  
 
This option has its own risks.  The process has been invoked only a few times, and it is 
invariably contentious.  It has sometimes reached a clear result (e.g., authorizing closure of the 
flood gates at Tellico Dam) and sometimes reached inconclusive, messy results (exempting 
certain BLM timber sales while courts continued to issue injunctions to protect spotted owls 
from other timber sales).  It seems an unlikely choice in an election year.  For the short term, I 
think we are headed for some version of the status quo:  the 2000 biological opinion, reloaded.   
 
C. Unbridled speculation about the longer term 
 
The longer term involves even grosser speculation.  I have already tipped my hand on the 
either/or question.  If it is truly either/or, it is unlikely to be salmon.  With climate change, the 
reluctance to breach dams is like to be stronger for two reasons:  First, as in 2001, climate-
induced crises are more likely to come in waves, and energy-related waves tend to be bigger than 
others.  Second, climate change is partly an energy problem, and hydropower helps with that 
problem.  Unless wind, solar and energy conservation can carry a great deal more of the energy 
load than anyone thinks they can, existing hydropower will be too attractive to sacrifice. 
 
                                                 
15  Alsea Valley Alliance v. Evans, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14443 (D. Ore.) (Sept. 10, 2001).  The 
basic holding of the case is that once the agency defines a relevant population unit for ESA consideration, 
the whole unit must be addressed in determining listing status. 
16 The re-named National Marine Fisheries Service. 
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At any given time, the choice may look either/or, or it may be clouded by confusing 
signals from the species.  The current, positive jump in salmon populations that people ascribe to 
favorable ocean conditions is an example.  No one at this point can say whether or how long 
good ocean conditions will persist.  If, somehow, ocean conditions are generally better in the 
long term than they were in the 1990s, and if inland water temperatures don’t get too warm, 
maybe we don’t reach the either/or point.  Sorting out genuine signals from “noise” in the 
ecosystem will play a critical role in understanding the effects of climate change so we have 
opportunities to react to them. 
As long as questions like this are unclear, people will continue to look for middle ground, 
taking small additional bites out of hydropower and working on riparian, watershed and estuary 
restoration to try to help salmon while also contending with pressures from population growth.  






Climate change may (and probably will) narrow the range of ecologically workable 
choices to accommodate species and human uses of the Columbia.  We have experienced 
something like this in the past in milder ways, but even so the complexity and pervasiveness of 
the causes of salmon declines have led to a tense and confused political debate.  Climate change 
is likely to push us to harder choices.  The question is how we can avoid repeating the patterns of 
the past, quarreling about whose fault it is, complaining about the lack of scientific certainty and 
looking for ways to have it all, while salmon and other cold-water species edge toward 
extinction. 
Either/Or?  Is it Hydropower or 
Salmon in the Northwest?




• A deep-seated conflict:  
– Salmon:  cultural icon, mainstay of a fishing 
economy, central focus of treaties, ESA and 
Clean Water Act
– Hydropower:  half the region’s energy; vital to 
NW ti d t C d C lif i d economy; e  o ana a, a orn a an  
Southwest energy systems
– Flood control navigation irrigation and , ,   
recreation

• Lower Snake River draw-down









Natural River Channel Reservoir Pool
• Litigation and its aftermath: 
1994 court rulings concluded that federal–       
recovery efforts were flawed
1994 99 interim opinion hinted at major– -       
changes at dams in 1999
– Dam-breaching looks cheaper easier more  , ,  
effective than draw-down
– The dilemma in 1998:     
• no authority for breaching
• breaching would help only Snake River fish
• The 2000 biological opinion:  
– Avoid jeopardy with federal and non-federal       
habitat restoration (long-term); tributary water 
solutions (short-term)
– Still hinting at major changes 5-10 years out 
based on monitoring and evaluation
N i l Wildlif F d i N i l• at ona  e e erat on v. at ona  
Marine Fisheries Service:   
2000 biological opinion is arbitrary and 
capricious because it improperly relied on 
federal habitat programs that weren’t cleared      
through ESA and non-federal programs not 
“reasonably certain to occur.”   
II. Effects of climate change     
• “Facts:”
• 3 degrees F higher average temperatures
• More rain less snow ,  
• Higher winter streamflows, lower 
summer streamflows 
• Spring runoff peaks about 2 weeks earlier
Ab t th l ff• ou  e same annua  runo
(Preliminary Results, University of Washington Climate Impacts Group)
Historic vs projected streamflows .  
Source:  A. F. Hamlet, Seeds of Crisis, Water Resources Policy and Development in the Columbia River Basin 
(University of Washington Climate Impacts Group, February 2002)





• What might it be like?      
• For the mainstem, consider 2001:  
h t d th– o , ry wea er
– chaotic energy markets
– hydro operations for salmon abandoned
– upturn in the ocean 
– record salmon returns
III.  What’s Next?
N t NWF NMFS d• ear erm:   v. reman :
• Is the 2000 opinion void?
Sh h bit t ( ith d h f h t h• ore up a a  programs w  a as  o  a c ery 
supplementation?
• Flood control bottleneck
• Renegotiate Columbia River Treaty?  
• Breach dams (which ones)?
• Jeopardy opinion, followed by exemption process?
• Longer term:  
M l i l i l i h li l di bili– u t p e cr ses over ap w t  tt e pre cta ty, 
sharper conflicts and narrower choices 
G h f h d i– reen ouse concerns avor y ropower, g ven 
current technologies and economics
Confusing signals from ecosystems–    
